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Abstract 
Decentralization reforms aim at strengthening democracy by promoting political participation among citizens. 
Research shows (1) that information is a prerequisite for political participation and (2) that people face 
different private costs in acquiring information. Here we combine the two lines of research and ask: what 
private costs hamper the acquisition of information on decentralization? For the analysis, we use data from an 
indigenous population of lowland Bolivia. We surveyed 319 Tsimane’ adults in 12 villages. We found that nine 
years after the passage of the decentralization laws, knowledge about those reforms had only partially reached 
the Tsimane’. People who live closer to municipal towns, had more schooling, and participated in the market 
economy were more aware of decentralization. Political authorities trying to spread the potential benefits of 
decentralization should address the structural limitations of the dissemination of political knowledge.
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Introduction
Democratic decentralization refers to the transfer of resources and power to lower government 
authorities that are democratic and independent of higher levels of government (Manor, 1999). 
Under democratic decentralization, citizens and their representatives are granted power in deci-
sion-making (Von Braun and Grote, 2002). It has been theorized that shifting the locus of power 
away from centralized authorities makes public service provision more efficient due to better tar-
geted policies and lower transaction costs (Faguet, 2004: 867–93).
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Because of the scale and potential impact of decentralization, researchers have analyzed its causes 
and consequences (Crook and Manor, 1998; Manor, 1999; Montero and Samuels, 2004; Smoke, 
2001; Van Cott, 2003: 751–75; Yashar, 1999: 76–104). Here we take a different approach and study 
the covariates of awareness of decentralization, because information about decentralization reforms 
– including knowledge of the new powers and capabilities of local government – is critical to the 
realization of accountability in decentralized systems (Montero and Samuels, 2004). We follow 
Zaller (1992) and define awareness of decentralization as the degree to which a citizen has informa-
tion about politics, and ask: what private costs hamper the acquisition of information on decentraliza-
tion? For the empirical analysis, we use unique data collected among adults from a farming-foraging 
population in the vicinity of a recently created municipality in the Bolivian Amazon. We hypothesize 
that people with higher private costs in gaining access to information would have less awareness of 
decentralization than those with lower private costs.
This research contributes to studies of decentralization in at least three ways. First, the study of 
political awareness among citizens is a relatively new field (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1993: 1179–
206). Recent research has focused on political knowledge as an explanatory variable for political 
attitudes and as a phenomenon to be explained in its own right (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1993: 
1179–206; Zaller, 1990, 1992). However, research on the measurement of political awareness is 
scarce and the studies on the topic focus on advanced industrial democracies (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter, 1993: 1179–206). Here we contribute to the nascent field of political awareness with a 
study of an indigenous group in a developing democracy.
Second, if decentralization reforms aim to promote political participation but limited informa-
tion hampers the participation of some citizens, then decentralization reforms would fail unless 
they level the varying degrees of citizens’ political awareness. By studying the correlates of aware-
ness of decentralization, we generate results that can inform policy-makers so they can promote 
policies that reach groups that have high costs of acquiring political knowledge.
Last, we contribute to research on decentralization by focusing on an often excluded population: 
lowland indigenous peoples. Studies of decentralization in Latin America have focused on cities 
(Campbell, 2003) or on highland populations (Van Cott, 2003: 751–75). Lowland indigenous peo-
ples are among the poorest in the world and are often excluded from national politics (Patrinos, 
1994). Because the Tsimane’ share many socioeconomic characteristics with other lowland indig-
enous peoples in Latin America, they illustrate the challenges faced by Latin American lowland 
indigenous peoples as they try to take part in decentralized political institutions.
Decentralization and Political Awareness
Scholars have argued that decentralization reforms have the potential to promote democratization 
and stimulate the growth of civil society by allowing people to participate in local politics and, as a 
consequence, to hold local authorities accountable (Diamond, 1999; Grindle, 2000; Hiskey and 
Seligson, 2003: 64–88; Yashar, 1999: 76–104). However, empirical research shows that only under 
some circumstances does decentralization enhance political participation and bring transparent, 
accountable, and responsive local governments. Where local institutions fulfill the needs of the citi-
zens, decentralization can strengthen citizen support of politics at a national level, but where the 
performance of local institutions falters, decentralization can spread corruption and favor entrenched 
local elites (Crook and Manor, 1998; Grindle, 2000; Hiskey and Seligson, 2003: 64–88).
Fundamental to meaningful democratic decentralization is downward accountability, or the 
ability of citizens to hold their officials accountable (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999: 473–503; Eckardt, 
2008: 1–17; Manor, 1999). In functioning democracies, formal rules and oversight provide a 
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system of checks that ensure the accountability of governments. However, in most developing 
countries formal rules are poorly enforced and oversight of government is weak. To ensure down-
ward accountability, citizens in developing countries must rely on instruments such as participation 
in elections and referenda, or the presence of multiple political parties (Blair, 2000: 21–39). For 
example, officials can be voted out of power through electoral processes, or citizens can move to 
jurisdictions with preferred public service provision (Seabright, 1996: 61–89). However, in most 
developing countries these opportunities are limited (Bardhan, 2002: 185–205; Echeverri-Gent, 
1992: 1401–22; Fiszbein, 1997: 1029–43) and the media and civil society engagement are the only 
means for helping in the realization of accountability.
Information about decentralization reforms – including knowledge of the new powers and capa-
bilities of local government – is critical to the realization of accountability in decentralized sys-
tems. Information leads to informed decision-making processes and might increase the political 
costs of not responding to local demands. Furthermore, Montero and Samuels (2004) found that 
citizen demands on local representatives increased with political awareness because knowledge-
able citizens can take advantage of the institutional mechanisms and resources that decentralization 
offers them. However, information is not equally available to all citizens. People face variable 
private costs – costs to the individual rather than to society – associated with acquiring, processing, 
and using political information (Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). 
For example, people with higher education levels have lower costs in understanding and process-
ing political information (Andersson, 2004: 233–49; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980), and people 
living in remote areas, or speaking minority languages have higher costs in acquiring political 
information because radio broadcasts are either unavailable or broadcast in the language of the 
majority.
Thus, decentralization reforms that aim to level the varying degrees of citizen political partici-
pation should first try to understand what costs hamper the acquisition of political information and 
then try to reach groups that face higher costs in acquiring knowledge about decentralization.
Decentralization and Indigenous Peoples in Bolivia
Decentralization Reform 
Among Latin American countries undergoing decentralization processes, Bolivia has been singled 
out as the most significant and innovative example (Mayorga, 1997: 143–63). The decentralization 
reform in Bolivia, first approved in 1994 by the Law of Popular Participation (LPP), had political, 
fiscal, and administrative components. It included (1) the direct election of municipal officials and 
the creation of new municipalities, (2) a substantial transfer of central government funds to the 
municipal governments, (3) the granting of tax categories to municipalities for raising their own 
revenues, (4) an increase in the development of the responsibilities and resources of municipal 
governments, (5) a censure provision to remove mayors in cases of misconduct, and (6) the 
responsibility of municipal governments to develop an Annual Operative Plan (AOP) or annual 
budgets reflecting the priorities of the municipal development plan (Faguet, 2004: 867–93; 
Grindle, 2000; Hiskey and Seligson, 2003: 64–88; O’Neill, 2003: 1068–91; Rengel, 2004).
The decentralization reform in Bolivia also incorporated the creation of a complex system to 
encourage citizens to get involved in local government. For example, the LPP begins by granting 
formal recognition to grassroots community organizations (Organización Territorial de Base) such 
as indigenous communities, neighborhood associations, and peasant associations. The law encour-
ages these entities to form municipal oversight committees (Comité de Vigilancia) to monitor local 
232  International Political Science Review 31(2)
governments, and grants them the right to petition the central government to suspend a municipal-
ity’s fiscal transfers in cases of mismanagement (O’Neill, 2003).
Indigenous People’s Political Participation 
In Bolivia, indigenous peoples have been excluded from political participation for most of modern 
history. Indigenous peoples were granted the right to vote after the 1952 revolution. In 1994 the 
state recognized the multiethnic nature of Bolivia and granted indi-genous people territorial rights, 
precipitating a growth in indigenous political influence (Hall and Patrinos, 2005).
Political influence in Bolivia is not equally distributed among all the indigenous groups. Because 
of the cultural background, indigenous politics in Bolivia has traditionally been dominated by 
highland indigenous organizations (Hall and Patrinos, 2005). Only during the last two decades 
have lowland indigenous organizations emerged in national politics. The main demands of lowland 
indigenous organizations have centered on territorial rights to protect lowland indigenous peoples 
from local encroachers on their land.
The Tsimane’ and Their Political Organization
The Tsimane’ are a farming-foraging society of about 8,000 people in the department of Beni in the 
Bolivian Amazon. Most of the territory they inhabit lies in the municipality of San Borja, one of 
the administrative units created under the Law of Municipalities. The town of San Borja (popula-
tion approximately 19,000) is at the heart of the municipality and the most important commercial 
center for the Tsimane’ villages in our study.
In common with other lowland indigenous peoples in Bolivia, most Tsimane’ live below the 
poverty line and have low levels of education (Godoy et al., 2002: 397–409; Hall and Patrinos, 
2005). At present the Tsimane’ connection with the modern market economy is through employ-
ment in the local labor market and through the sale of agricultural and forest products. The Tsimane’ 
work on cattle ranches, in logging camps, and in the farms of colonist farmers. Some Tsimane’ with 
education and Spanish fluency are employed as teachers or with local organizations.
Following a common trend among Bolivian lowland indigenous groups, during the 1980s the 
Tsimane’ started to organize politically. In 1989 the Tsimane’ created their own political organiza-
tion, the Great Tsimane’ Council, whose main role was to channel demands from the Tsimane’ to 
national institutions. With the passing of the decentralization law, Tsimane’ participation in politics 
changed in two ways. First, like other groups, the Tsimane’ created grassroots community organi-
zations (GCOs). Villages close to the municipality town were the first to form GCOs; more isolated 
villages followed. Members of GCOs direct their demands to the Great Tsimane’ Council, which 
in turn presents them to the municipal government. Second, in 2002 the counselor of the town hall 
of San Borja decreed the creation of an indigenous sub-municipality. Legally, the sub-municipality 
cannot ask for separate funds from the Bolivian government, but it can obtain funds through the 
municipal budget of San Borja. However, at the time of writing (2008) no funds had been received.
Despite these opportunities, Tsimane’ participation in local government is limited and generally 
restricted to Tsimane’ representatives. For example, members of GCOs do not participate directly 
in the municipal government; they channel their demands through the Great Tsimane’ Council. To 
date no indigenous representatives – including those on the Great Tsimane’ Council – have been 
elected as members of the municipal government.
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Hypotheses
To study the private costs that influence the acquisition of information on decentralization, we 
equate awareness of decentralization with the private costs of gaining information on decentraliza-
tion reforms. We expect that people with higher private costs in gaining access to information will 
have less awareness of decentralization. Specifically, we hypothesize that distance from local 
urban centers is negatively associated with awareness of decentralization (H1). We also hypothe-
size that information about decentralization decreases with distance from the respondent’s house-
hold to the village center (H2). In the study site villagers typically hold meetings in village schools, 
so people living a long way from the school will be less likely to be aware of meetings and also 
face higher costs to attend meetings. We also hypothesize that people with less schooling will know 
less about decentralization (H3), because some of the mechanisms through which people can par-
ticipate in and benefit from national society (e.g. voting or having an identity card) require skills in 
reading, writing, or speaking Spanish, the national language in Bolivia. People with lower levels 
of education and of fluency in Spanish are also excluded from accessing print media and most 
radio broadcasts in Bolivia. Finally, we hypothesize that people who enter the market economy 
through wage labor and the sale of products will know more about decentralization than more 
autarkic people (H4). People engaged in the market economy are more likely to obtain legal docu-
ments since such documents facilitate work in cities.
Estimation Strategy 
For the empirical analysis, we estimate the parameters of the following expression:
 A
ihv
 = α + λG
ihv
 + γE
ihv
 + ψM
ihv
 + βD
ihv
 + ε
ihv 
(1)
A
ihv
 stands for awareness of decentralization of participant i of household h and village v. G
ihv
 is a 
vector of two variables that proxy for distance from the person’s house to (1) the village school and 
(2) the closest market town. E
ihv
 is a vector of variables related to human capital that includes flu-
ency in speaking Spanish and the highest grade completed in school. M
ihv
 captures the individual’s 
level of integration in the market economy. D
ihv
 stands for the age and sex of the participant. ε
ihv
 is 
a random error term.
We expect the coefficient of the variable for distance (λ) to be negatively associated with aware-
ness of decentralization (H1 and H2), and the coefficients of modern human capital (γ) and integra-
tion in the market (ψ) to be positively associated with awareness of decentralization (H3 and H4).
For the analysis, we use ordinary least square and probit regressions. Since we did not have 
convincing instrumental variables to control for the endogeneity of the explanatory variables, 
we cannot infer causality from the parameters we estimate. For example, it is possible that 
people who speak Spanish have high awareness of decentralization, but it is also possible that 
people who gained knowledge of decentralization decided to learn Spanish. Therefore, we do 
not talk about causality but about association between the variables explored. Unless indicated 
otherwise, we only discuss values associated with awareness of decentralization at a 90 percent 
confidence level or above.
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Methods
The information comes from a study conducted between August 2002 and November 2003. Data 
were collected in four quarterly surveys carried out among the same participants. We collected 
demographic information (i.e. age, sex, schooling, distance from town) during the first quarter 
and information on political awareness during the last quarter. To capture seasonal variation in 
sources of income, we collected information on income from wages and sales throughout the four 
quarters. Four female and four male researchers collected the information, using translators for the 
interviews.
Sample 
We carried out surveys in 174 households in 12 Tsimane’ villages in the municipality of San Borja. 
To select villages, we used distance from the village to the town of San Borja. It takes one day by 
canoe from San Borja to reach the remotest village in the sample, and a one-hour walk to reach the 
closest. All the people of voting age, i.e. 18 or over, in all the households in the 12 villages were 
interviewed. The total sample included 319 participants, 51 percent men and 49 percent women.
Dependent Variable 
We followed Zaller (1990, 1992) and collected information on awareness of decentralization 
through a questionnaire. We asked one question about the Decentralization Law and one about the 
Popular Participation Law, two questions related to mechanisms created by decentralization reforms 
(i.e. Grassroots Community Organization and Annual Operating Plan), and two questions related 
to the local municipality (i.e. name of the mayor and name of the municipality). No one knew about 
the Decentralization Law, so we excluded that variable from our summary measure. The remaining 
five variables had statistically significant and positive correlation coefficients (from 0.21 to 0.40) 
and a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.64, so we used them to construct a summary measure of awareness of 
decentralization using principal component factor analysis (see Table 1).
Explanatory Variables
Distance to town and village school: Villages varied in terms of their distance to the municipal 
town. We divided villages into two groups. The first group included five villages located between 
6 and 15 km from the town of San Borja. The second group included seven villages located between 
33 and 50 km from the town of San Borja. The settlement pattern of the villages was nucleated.
Modern human capital: We defined schooling as the highest school grade completed by the 
participant. Interviewers evaluated the participants’ fluency in spoken Spanish during the survey 
and assigned a “one” if the person was able to answer the survey in Spanish and zero otherwise. 
Some 34 percent of the sample was able to answer the survey in Spanish.
Integration in the market: We asked participants about cash income from wage labor and the 
sale of products during the 14 days prior to the interview. Since we collected information on cash 
income four times during the study, we averaged the information over the four quarters to obtain a 
single measure per person.
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Results
Awareness of Decentralization 
We found that the Tsimane’ lacked knowledge of the Decentralization Law, had little knowledge of 
the Popular Participation Law, and had a limited awareness of the mechanisms and institutions 
used to implement the political reforms. When asked directly whether they knew the purpose of the 
Decentralization Law, none of the participants said they did. Only 5 percent of the sample had ever 
heard about the much-touted Popular Participation Law (see Table 2). Awareness of the mecha-
nisms and institutions used to implement decentralization reforms was higher than awareness of 
the laws themselves, but still low. Only 29 percent of the people interviewed knew the name of the 
municipality on which their village depended, and only 21 percent knew the name of the mayor of 
the municipality at the time of the survey. Although in each of the study villages there was a repre-
sentative for the Grassroots Community Organization, we found that only 12 percent of the people 
knew the function of a GCO. We also found that only 2 percent of the respondents knew the pur-
pose of the municipal Annual Operating Plan.
We found statistically significant differences in the level of awareness of decentralization 
between the Tsimane’ living close to and those living far from San Borja. The Tsimane’ living close 
to San Borja had higher levels of awareness of the Grassroots Community Organization and of 
the municipal Annual Operating Plan. The percentage of people who knew the name of the 
Table 1.  Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in Regression Analysis
Variable              Definition Obs Mean SD
Awareness of decentralization
Awareness Sum of positive answers to five  319 0.68  1.05 
 yes/no questions on decentralization
Distance to town and village school
Distance to Distance from the village to the   12 27.5 15.69 
town center of the municipality, in km
Time to school Time taken to walk from the house  174 10.5 11.6 
 to the village school, in minutes
Modern human capital
School grade Highest school grade  319  2.0  2.5 
 completed by subject
Spanish Ability to speak Spanish fluently as 319  0.34  0.47 
 determined by surveyor (1=yes; 0=no) 
Integration in the market
Wage Individual earnings from wage labor for 319 43.2 95.0 
 14 days prior to the day of the interview,  
 in bolivianos
Sales Individual earnings from cash sale of  319 40.3 87.7 
 products for 14 days prior to the day of 
 the interview, in bolivianos
Control
Age Age of participant, in years 319 35.1 14.7
Male Percentage of males (1=male; 0=female) 319 51 50
Source: Data collected and elaborated by authors. 1 US$ = 7.35 bolivianos
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municipality mayor was also higher among the Tsimane’ living close to San Borja than among those 
who lived farther away (see Table 2).
Correlates of Awareness of Decentralization 
In Table 3 we present the results of three regression models. In the first model we test the associa-
tion between awareness of decentralization and village-to-town and house-to-school distance (H1 
and H2). In the second model we add variables related to human capital (H3). In the third model 
we add variables that serve as proxies for participation in the market economy (H4).
The results from the first regression (column [1]) confirm H1 and H2, i.e. awareness of decen-
tralization is positively associated with physical proximity to sources of information. A 1 percent 
increase in the distance from the village to the town of San Borja correlated with a decrease of 0.29 
standard deviations in the index of awareness of decentralization (p < 0.02). Each extra minute of 
walking time between the household and the village school was associated with a 0.01 lower score 
of awareness of decentralization (p < 0.01). We tested for the joint significance of the two variables 
that proxy for distance and found evidence that the two variables together had a statistically signifi-
cant negative association with awareness of decentralization (F = 4.94; p > F = 0.02).
In column [2] we found that an additional year of schooling was associated with 0.20 higher 
standard deviations in the score of awareness of decentralization (p < 0.01). Speaking Spanish was 
also associated with an increase of 0.36 standard deviations in the score of awareness of decentral-
ization (p < 0.01). As expected, the two variables that proxy for modern human capital – schooling 
and fluency in spoken Spanish – had a significant joint positive association with awareness 
of decentralization (F = 16.79; p > F = 0.0005). In this model, the sign and level of statistical 
Table 2.  Mean Percentage and Standard Deviation of Variables Measuring Awareness of Decentralization 
and t-test of the Difference between Tsimane’ Living Close to and Far from the Center of the Municipality 
(n=319)
Description of Variable Pooled Close Far t-test
PPL
Have you heard about the Popular  5±22 4±21 5±23 Ns
Participation Law? (1=yes; 0=no)
Municipality
Do you know which municipality  28±45 28±45 28±45 Ns
your village depends on? (1=yes; 0=no)
Mayor
Do you know the name of the mayor  21±41 27±45 16±37 0.01
of the municipality? (1=yes; 0=no)
GCO
Do you know what a Grassroots Community  12±32 17±37 7±26 0.004
Organization is? (1=yes; 0=no)
AOP
Do you know what a municipal Annual  2±15 4±20 0.6±7 0.01
Operating Plan is? (1=yes; 0=no)
Note: The number after ± is the standard deviation (SD); Ns = not significant; close = 6 to 15 km to the town center of 
the municipality; far = 30 to 50 km to the town center of the municipality.
Source: Data collected and elaborated by authors.
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significance of the variables related to distance to town and village school resemble those of 
column [1].
Last, in column [3] we find a positive association between awareness of decentralization and 
income from wage labor. With each extra boliviano earned from wage labor, adults had 0.004 
higher standard deviations in their score of awareness (p < 0.01). Similarly, we found that income 
from the sale of products bore a positive and statistically significant association with awareness of 
decentralization. The two variables (wage labor and monetary income) had a joint significant asso-
ciation with awareness of decentralization (F = 84.96; p > F = 0.0001). Adding the variables that 
proxy for integration in the market did not change the sign or level of statistical significance of the 
variables related to distance, but it did make the coefficient for the variable Spanish fluency statisti-
cally insignificant.
Extensions 
We extended the analysis in two different ways. First, we ran equation 1 with the different proxies 
of awareness of decentralization separately (see Table 4). The results of the Cronbach’s alpha were 
Table 3.  Covariates of Awareness of Decentralization among Tsimane’ Indigenous Peoples (n=319) 
Explanatory Variables                 Models:
 [1] [2] [3]
Distance to town and village school
Distance to town (log) -.29(.10)** -.27(.08)*** -.29(.05)***
Time to school -.01(.004)** -.09(.004)** -.005(.003)
Modern human capital
School grade ^ .20(.04)*** .12(.04)***
Spanish ^ .36(.09)*** .16(.09)
Integration in the market
Wage ^ ^ .004(.001)***
Sales ^ ^ .002(.000)***
Control
Male .66(.11)*** .25(.08)*** .05(.08)
Age -.01(.005) .01(.003)*** .004(.002)*
Joint test
Distance to town +  4.94(.02) 5.53(.02) 22.34(.0001)
Time to school
School grade + Spanish  16.79(.0005) 5.46(.02)
Wage + Sales   84.96(.0000)
R2 0.16 0.40 0.50
Notes: Dependent variable is the individual score in the vector of awareness of decentralization calculated with principal 
component factor analysis. 
[1] Model with distance and control variables. [2] Model with distance, human capital, and control variables. [3] Model 
with distance, human capital, market integration, and control variables. Regressions are OLS with robust standard errors 
(in parentheses) adjusted for clustering on village of residency. Regressions include constant (not shown). 
*, **, and *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
^ variable intentionally excluded from the analysis.
Source: Data collected and elaborated by authors.
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too low to create a convincing index. Furthermore, the results from the index do not allow one to 
assess which dimension of awareness of decentralization was particularly associated with the 
explanatory variables. We found that an increase in the distance from the village to the town was 
associated with a decrease in the probability of knowing the name of the municipality’s mayor and 
the function of a Grassroots Community Organization. Distance between the household and the 
village school appeared to be associated with a lower score for awareness of the name of the mayor. 
Schooling was positively associated with the four proxies of awareness of decentralization (col-
umns [1] to [4]), whereas fluency in spoken Spanish was positively associated only with knowl-
edge of the Popular Participation Law (column [1]). Finally, income through wage labor was 
positively associated with the four proxies of awareness of decentralization, whereas sale of prod-
ucts was related to two of the proxies of awareness of decentralization. The positive joint effect of 
individual wage labor and sale of products on awareness was significant in the four models used.
Second, we used as dependent variables proxies of awareness of national and local politics (not 
shown). In the regression using as a dependent variable awareness of national politics (i.e. having 
voted in the last national election and knowledge of the results of the election), we found that 
awareness of national politics was positively and significantly associated with higher income from 
sales and wage labor, but not with distance to town or with variables related to modern human capi-
tal. In the regression using as a dependent variable awareness of local politics (i.e. name of the 
president of the Great Tsimane’ Council, name of the indigenous mayor, and name of the village 
Table 4.  Covariates of Various Proxies for Awareness of Decentralization among the Tsimane’ (n=319)
Explanatory Variables            Dependent Variables:
 [1] [2] [3] [4]
 PPL Municipality Mayor GCO
Distance to town and village school
Distance to town (log) -.001 -.05 -.12*** -.07***
Time to school -.0002 -.002 -.004*** -.001
Modern human capital
School grade .01* .03** .02* .02***
Spanish .05** .03 .09 .02
Integration in the market
Wage .0001 .002*** .001** .0001*
Sales .0001** .0004 .005 .0002*
Control
Male .01 .01 .06 .07***
Age .001* .001 -.004* .002
Joint tests
Distance to town +  0.16(.92) 0.66(.72) 43.57(.0000) 6.95(.03) 
Time to school
School grade + Spanish 5.20(.07) 8.77(.01) 3.13(.20) 17.09(.0002)
Wage + Sales 10.18(.006) 47.53(.0000) 5.31(.07) 7.27(.02)
Pseudo R2 .30 .17 .28 .30
Notes: Regressions are probit with standard errors adjusted for clustering on village of residency. 
*, **, and *** statistically significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level. 
For definition of dependent variables see Table 3, and for definitions of explanatory variables see Table 2.
Source: Data collected and elaborated by authors.
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representative of the Grassroots Community Organization), we found that awareness of local poli-
tics was negatively associated with distance to town and village school, and positively associated 
with income from wage labor.
Discussion and Conclusion
Two main findings deserve discussion. First, we found that, despite the passage of nine years 
since the enactment of the laws of decentralization, knowledge about decentralization reforms 
had only modestly reached the Tsimane’. The Tsimane’ have very limited awareness of the 
Decentralization and Popular Participation laws. Their knowledge about the institutions and 
mechanisms related to this reform is also scarce. Second, our analysis confirms the hypothesis 
that people who face higher costs in accessing information are less aware of decentralization. We 
found that people who lived closer to the municipal town and to the village school had more edu-
cation, participated in the market economy and were more aware of decentralization than people 
without those characteristics. Contrary to our expectations, fluency in Spanish was not associated 
with political awareness.
The first finding – that the Tsimane’ know little about decentralization laws and national politics 
– contrasts with the contemporaneous rise in indigenous movements in Bolivian national politics 
(Hall and Patrinos, 2005). Data presented here were collected in 2002, the same year that the first 
indigenous representatives entered the Bolivian Congress. Since then, an indigenous leader has 
become president of Bolivia. The low level of Tsimane’ awareness of decentralization also con-
trasts with the initiatives of the municipal government to incorporate the Tsimane’ in local politics 
through the creation of a sub-municipality.
We suggest two explanations as to why the Tsimane’ have remained unaware of national politics 
despite local municipal efforts and at a time when other indigenous peoples were increasing their 
participation in national politics. First, the low level of political awareness among the Tsimane’ 
might contrast with the general increase in indigenous politics in Bolivia, but it could be representa-
tive of lowland indigenous peoples. We do not have much information about efforts to promote the 
decentralization reforms among the indigenous population in Bolivia. Research suggests that when 
decentralization laws were first passed in Bolivia, the government, national political parties, and 
international agencies were active in providing information about the decentralization reforms 
(Grindle, 2000; O’Neill, 2003: 1068–91). Nongovernmental organizations also contributed to the 
effort and used radio messages, workshops, and pamphlets to spread information about decentral-
ization. But our own observations suggest that the effort was more intense in the highland than in 
the lowland areas. It is also possible that because highland indigenous peoples have a long tradition 
of social stratification and communal organization (Kohl, 2003: 153–64), highland indigenous cul-
tural practices and ways of life fit better with the new way of structuring society proposed by the 
decentralization reforms. Thus, highland indigenous peoples could have been more receptive to and 
understood better the political changes undertaken by the reforms. By contrast, the Tsimane’, like 
other native Amazonian societies (Johnson, 2003), have traditionally been a highly egalitarian and 
acephalous society (Ellis, 1996). Tsimane’ individuals and households have traditionally enjoyed 
high levels of autonomy in production and household activities, and their social structure is centered 
around the extended family (Daillant, 2003; Huanca, 2008). For the Tsimane’, the political structure 
proposed by the decentralization reforms might be as foreign as the previous centralized political 
structure, thus making it hard for them to adopt and take advantage of these political spaces. 
Unfortunately, we do not have information on how Tsimane’ levels of awareness of decentralization 
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compare with the levels of political awareness of other lowland and highland indigenous groups. 
More empirical research is needed to explore the plausibility of this explanation.
The second explanation of why the Tsimane’ have low levels of awareness of decentralization 
relates to the combination of the uneven reach of the state in Bolivia (Yashar, 1999: 76–104) and 
geographic (e.g. distance between villages and municipal town) and socioeconomic (e.g. years of 
schooling and integration in the market) conditions. This combination might explain the high costs 
implied in acquiring political information among the Tsimane’ as a group. It is important to stress 
that these conditions are structural, and thus it is difficult for lowland indigenous peoples to over-
come them on their own.
The two explanations highlight the failure of decentralization policies to overcome the struc-
tural problems that create inequalities among citizens of the same country (Larson et al., 2007: 
251–68). Decentralization policies were originally conceived as a way to transfer powers or 
responsibilities from the center to local governments, because centralized governments seemed not 
to reach all the citizens. The results presented here suggest that the implementation of decentraliza-
tion reforms suffers from the same structural problems they are attempting to overcome.
The second finding that deserves discussion is the association between awareness of decentral-
ization and socioeconomic characteristics. Similarly to Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980), we find 
that people who have a higher income, are older, and have more schooling face lower costs in 
acquiring information on politics. The finding that socioeconomic characteristics are linked to 
awareness of decentralization has implications for policy-makers. If policy-makers want to have a 
large share of the population participating in national and local politics to avoid the entrenchment 
of power in the hands of a minority, but find that information on decentralization only reaches 
selected groups, then they must level the informational playing field by focusing on policies that 
reach groups with less knowledge of decentralization. Strategies to lower the costs of decentraliza-
tion should take into account the factors that increase the costs of accessing the information (e.g. 
distance). For example, authorities should invest proportionately more resources in reaching iso-
lated, poorly educated citizens than they do in reaching organized, well-connected, and educated 
citizens.
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